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Use of Transaction Cost Economics Framework to Study
Information Technology Sourcing: Over-Application or
Under-Theorizing?
Introduction
Information Technology (IT) outsourcing can be defined as “the delegation, through a
contractual arrangement, of all or any part of the technical resources, human resources, and
the management responsibilities associated with providing IT services to an external vendor”
(Clark et al., 1995). Information Systems (IS) researchers have sought an understanding of
this phenomenon over the last decade using theories drawn from various reference
disciplines. Transaction cost economics (TCE) (Ang and Straub, 1998), agency theory
(Logan, 2000), and the resource based view (RBV) (Teng et al., 1995) have been the three
most popular theories to explain IT sourcing phenomenon: they account for a majority of
research articles in a recent review (Hui and Beath, 2001). These theories differ in their
assumptions and ontologies in that they identify a different set of issues within their
underlying assumptions to explain outsourcing outcomes. Traditional microeconomic
theories of economic decision making assume an underlying economic rationality of “homo
economicus” that maximizes expected utility, while more recent decision theories attempt to
go beyond the narrow efficiency seeking approach of microeconomics. Among the former set
of lenses, Transaction Cost Economics is the most frequently used approach.
This paper introduces basic concepts of TCE by focusing on its implicit assumptions
and fundamental constructs (Williamson, 1985). Thereafter, a sample of widely cited research
papers applying TCE is selected and we synthesize major findings related to each TCE
construct. These are used to put forward research questions concerning each construct and
how the research agenda could be furthered with regard to that construct. Discussion section
outlines some limitations of TCE, suggests alternative theoretical lenses that could overcome
those limitations, and draws some implications for future IS research.
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
This section reviews Transaction cost economics, and assesses the use of its discrete
components in the IS literature. The key constructs of TCE: frequency, asset specificity,
opportunism, and uncertainty are explored with regard to their use and operationalization.
This is done in parallel with critically evaluating and deconstructing the assumptions of the
original theory.
Transaction Cost Economics: Assumptions and Variables
Frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty form the key components of TCE that
are used to explain how firm’s boundaries are drawn, and when a good is transacted in a
hierarchy instead of the market. In other words, TCE sets out to predict the boundaries of the
firm given the characteristics of a transaction along these key dimensions. Drawing on the
work of Commons (1934) and Coase (1937), among others, Williamson’s books and papers
have become a leading influence in management and economics to address this issue.
In order to unpack these key dimensions of TCE, it is helpful to compare them with
the assumptions that characterize transactions in ‘perfect’ markets in classical economic
theory. The following table (Table 1) shows the assumptions that are relaxed in TCE in order
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to reconcile economic theory with the organizational reality─in that we have both hierarchies
and markets.
Neoclassical Assumptions

Transaction Cost Economics Relaxations

Information

Perfect information

Asymmetries, leading to uncertainty

Buyers & sellers

Many buyers and sellers

Small number, leading to opportunism

Specificity

Identity of buyer/seller does not
matter

Identity of the buyer-seller dyad matters, leading to asset specificity

Rationality

Rational actors

Economic actors are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”, or
bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985)

Maximization of
utility

Maximizing orientation

“Unobjectionable, if all of the relevant costs are recognized.”
(Williamson, 1985)

Table 1. Transaction Cost Economics assumptions
TCE relaxes the assumption of perfect information conceding that decision trees
cannot be drawn even for moderately complex transactions in the real world. In addition,
parties involved in the transaction do not reveal all the information they have as a symptom
of their opportunistic behavior. A large number of buyers and sellers with nearly identical
products (which results in market efficiency) is relaxed to ‘small numbers bargaining’. The
good transacted, as a corollary, are somewhat specific to each buyer-seller set, which is not
the case in the ‘open’ market. Rationality of actors is limited as they cannot recognize all
‘relevant costs’. This assumes a complex set of utility functions which are not easily subject
to optimization.
Transaction cost economics then uses frequency and asset specificity to propose an
“optimal” set of governance structure (Williamson, 1985) for each combination (Table 2). As
Williamson suggests: “The cost effective choice of organization form is shown to vary
systematically with the attributes of transactions.”(Williamson, 1985)
Asset Specificity
Frequency

Non-specific

Occasional

Outsource with classical
contract

Recurrent

Mixed

Idiosyncratic

Outsource with neo-classical contract
Relational contract

Insource

Table 2. Governance structure under Transaction Cost Economics
In this framework transaction frequency is either occasional or recurrent. Asset
specificity is related to alternative uses of the asset involved in the transaction, and it is
measured by the lack of standardization. Highly standardized assets imply low asset
specificity, and highly customized ones are seen to possess high asset specificity. ‘Mixed’
means an intermediate level of asset specificity. As shown in the framework non-specific
assets lead to low transaction costs. In this case, the use of standard, undifferentiated
contracts is adequate for occasional or recurrent transactions. As we move towards higher
asset specificity, the contract differs by the frequency of transaction. For occasional
transactions, e.g., buying capital equipment, ‘neo-classical’ contracts with third-party
arbitration clauses are used to minimize transaction costs. For recurrent transactions, high
asset specificity leads to high transaction costs, which are minimized by insourcing. Lower
levels of specificity are handled by ‘relational’ contracts which try to control transaction
costs, while taking the advantage of market efficiencies. The incentive to continue the
relationship minimizes transaction costs.
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Clearly, this framework suggests an optimal match between characteristics of the
transactions and the associated governance structure but its application is limited─by
necessity─by the choice of its main constructs and their operationalization, viz., asset
specificity and frequency. Moreover, in line with traditional economic thinking efficiency
seeking in the long term seems to be the only motivator considered in the sourcing decisions.
This efficiency is, however, not absolute, but comparative and relates to the types of
transaction characteristics that are measured on ordinal scales.
It also seems that the suggested constructs of TCE are difficult to operationalize.
Different authors have used different set of measures for the same construct leading to
different confounding results. Notwithstanding arguments for TCE as a basis for theorizing
about strategy (Williamson, 1991), difficulties in empirical work have limited the application
of TCE theory. Disagreements concerning the empirical validity of TCE have led to mixed
record of success in organizational and economics literature (David and Han, 2004). Yet,
asset specificity, uncertainty, and transaction costs have been the most commonly used as
independent variables, with the highest level of support for asset specificity. In the following
section, we review applications of frequency, asset specificity, opportunism, uncertainty, and
production costs, in a selected set of IS research papers related to sourcing.

Application of Transaction Cost Economics
This section reviews the application of TCE in a sample of the IT outsourcing
literature. A representative set of widely cited research papers on IT outsourcing was created.
We analyzed the findings concerning outsourcing decisions and how each TCE construct
affected the choice and was operationalized in each paper. These findings suggest a set of
research questions concerning each construct that help shape future research agenda, and also
clarify potential theoretical contributions of TCE for IT outsourcing research.
Selected Papers
The main source of research literature on IT outsourcing was the review (Hui and
Beath, 2001) . They selected these papers as ‘representative work’ in each substantive area of
IT outsourcing. In addition, ABI/Inform was used to identify additional research papers in IT
Sourcing. Each listed paper was checked separately in terms of theoretical base, research
questions and applied research methodology. Only those papers that showed a clear use of
Transaction Cost Economics in their theoretical base and research questions were selected for
further analysis. As shown in table 3, most papers were selected from top-tier IS journals and
conferences, and they mostly covered the period from 1994 to 1998. Most of the research
involved empirical work, and details such as sample sizes, significance tests and major results
(regressions) are reported when available. It was difficult to check for a representative sample
across these studies in any statistical meta-analytical sense, given the narrow criteria
deployed and the poor operationalization of many of the constructs. The key areas of interest
were the deployment of TCE constructs and how they predicted outsourcing decisions (i.e.
firm’s boundaries). We verified through a content and validity checks whether the construct
was covered in the study, how it was operationalized and what (significant) results were
observed. The significance and sign of results was important in order to compare the findings
with TCE predictions.
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Article

Year of
Publication

Study Type

Sample
Size (if
empirical)

Transaction Cost Economics Dimensions
(selected operationalizations shown in brackets)
Frequency

Asset
Specificity

Opportunism

Uncertainty

Production
Cost

Y

Y

Y*

Y*

Apte

1990

Conceptual

Y

Ang &
Cummings

1997

Survey

221

Ang &
Straub

1998

Survey

225

Aubert et al

1996

Case study

10

Cheon et al

1995

Conceptual

De Looff

1998

Case study

23

Heiskanen
et al

1996

Case study

3

Jurison

1995

Conceptual

Lacity &
Willcocks

1995

Case study

61

Loh

1994

Survey

226

Loh &
Venkatraman

1995

Survey

159

Nam et al

1994

Case study

10

Y

Nam et al

1996

Survey

154

Y

Poppo

1998

Survey

152

Y*

Y

Saarinen

1994

Survey

55

Y

Y

Smith

2003

Conceptual

Y

Y*
(supplier
presence)

Y*
(perceived measure of transaction cost)
Y*

Y*

Y

Y

Y*
Y*

Y*
(many
suppliers)
Y*

Y

Y

Y*
(clear
requirements)

Y*

Y*
Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y*
(composite
measure)
Y
Y
(number of
potential
vendors)

Y

Y

Y*

Y*
(scale
economies
at buyer
firm)
Y

Y shows dimension(s) covered in the study, with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk*

Table 3. Application of Transaction Cost Economics in sourcing
Main findings on Transaction Cost Economics
In our sample uncertainty and asset specificity constructs were used most frequently
in the selected articles (table 3). As expected, there are several different operationalizations
for these key constructs. The results are somewhat mixed, and generally weak. In what
follows, each construct is defined with reference to Williamson (Williamson, 1985) and we
survey how studies have conformed or digressed from this reference.
Uncertainty
TCE (Williamson, 1985) refers to uncertainty of a strategic kind “attributable to
opportunism…bounded rationality limits are quickly reached─since the entire decision tree
cannot be generated for even moderately complex problems” (p. 59). Strong self-interest
seeking leads the participants to provide selective information. Given the bounded rationality,
©2005 Sprouts 4(2) pp 98-110 http://sprouts.case.edu/2004/040206.pdf
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it is not possible to make optimal choices. In combination these behavioral assumptions lead
to uncertainty.
Most empirical papers included some measure of uncertainty (Table 4). The
conclusions on how uncertainty affects governance of IT are mixed, even somewhat
conflicting. Support for TCE predictions was seen in case study work (Aubert et al., 1996,
DeLooff, 1998, Heiskanen et al., 1996), and in one survey (Nam et al., 1996). The other
surveys (Loh, 1994, Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) did not find
significant relation between uncertainty (as operationalized) and outsourcing. One surveybased study (Ang and Cummings, 1997) reported higher uncertainty leading to more (not
less) outsourcing. They observe “as technological uncertainties escalated, large banks
adhered more closely to sourcing arrangements advocated and legitimatized by regulators.”
Among the studies we observed a variety of operationalizations. Uncertainty was
framed as a measurement problem (Aubert et al., 1996), in which the buyer’s ability to
measure IS services is important. Observability and verifiability were suggested as conditions
for effective measurement. Measurable services could be outsourced easily. In contrast,
software development was difficult to measure, and hence, more difficult to outsource.
Concluding that outsourcing is advisable (only) when requirements are specified in advance,
and measured later, seemed to arise from controllability ratings (DeLooff, 1998). Heiskanen
et al (Heiskanen et al., 1996) combined uncertainty with asset specificity to divide systems
into routine, standard, and speculative, with recommendations as market, hybrid, and
hierarchy, respectively. Uncertainty of IS function (Nam et al., 1996) was negatively related
to substitution by vendor.
Uncertainty
Article

Study Type

Operationalization

Significance

Ang & Cummings

Survey

Technological uncertainty

Y*

Aubert et al

Case study

Observability, Verifiability

Y*

Case study

Requirements for services can be specified in advance, and measured
afterwards (clear requirements)

Y*

De Looff
Heiskanen et al

Case study

(lack of) well-specified requirements

Y*

Loh

Survey

Obsolescence of current h/software, Cost-performance trends,
Quality of final outputs

Y

Nam et al

Survey

NA

Y*

Poppo

Survey

Technological uncertainty

Y

Saarinen

Survey

Requirement specification

Y

significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk*

Table 4. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension ‘uncertainty’ in sourcing
Broader measures of uncertainty were also used (Loh, 1994) which related it to
‘dyadic costs’ showed an insignificant path coefficient. Technological uncertainty had no
effect (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) on sourcing choices. In contrast to Heiskanen, requirement
uncertainty (Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) (similarly combined with specificity) seems to
have no effect on sourcing choice. These results lead to the following research questions:
RQ1: Under which conditions (of asset specificity) is uncertainty a
significant factor?
RQ2: Among business, environmental, or technological uncertainty, which
factor is more relevant- as TCE only recognizes business (actor
related) uncertainty?
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RQ3: How are regulatory governance perceptions formed in the first place?
Is it ‘received wisdom’ in the industry? What are its dynamic
characteristics?
RQ4: How do buyers interact with vendors and technologies at different
stages of technology deployment, so as to form varying perceptions of
uncertainty?
RQ5: How is uncertainty related to trust, and what are its antecedents in the
context of sourcing?
Asset Specificity
TCE (Williamson, 1985) classifies assets on their degree of specificity, as wholly
specific and non-specific (p. 54-55). These are explained further as “durable investments that
are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which is much
lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users…”. In other words, it refers to the lack of
alternative use of underlying assets.
This can be regarded easily to be the most important construct of TCE- which
differentiates it from neoclassical economics. It is claimed that “the importance of asset
specificity to Transaction Cost Economics is difficult to exaggerate…” (p. 56) although
additional conditions are added later in this stream. Yet, the papers shows weak support for
this key construct (table 5). Two case study papers (Aubert et al., 1996, Heiskanen et al.,
1996) and one survey-based article (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) show evidence that supports
transaction cost theory, while others show insignificant results.
Type of activity (Aubert et al., 1996), with software development and operations at
the opposite ends of spectrum, seemed to explain outsourcing. When firm specificity was
combined with requirement uncertainty, sourcing decisions (Heiskanen et al., 1996) could be
explained. Lower satisfaction was observed with outsourced activities as these became
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998) more firm-specific.
Asset Specificity
Article

Study Type

Operationalization

Significance

Ang & Cummings

Survey

Investment in specialized equipment, Specialized technical
skills specific to (buyer) firm, Specific business skills &
knowledge to buyer

Y

Aubert et al

Case study

Software development activity (type)

Y*

Heiskanen et al

Case study

Specificity to buyer company

Y*

Lacity & Willcocks

Case study

Seen as support/commodity or specialized

Y

Loh

Survey

Overall architecture, Operating procedures, IT
knowledge/experience base, IT staff training

Y

Nam et al

Survey

NA

Y

Poppo

Survey

Firm-specific assets

Y*

Saarinen

Survey

Managers’ estimates, Level of using existing system as a
basis for requirements

Y

significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk*

Table 5. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension ‘asset specificity’ in sourcing
At an overall level (Ang and Cummings, 1997) specificity shows weak correlation
with outsourcing. However, analogous to the effect of regulatory influence, interaction with
firm size and peer influence showed expected effects. Broader measures of asset specificity
(Loh, 1994) and relating it to ‘dyadic costs’ showed an insignificant path coefficient. In
trying to explain the extent of substitution by vendors, asset specificity (Nam et al., 1996)
was not significant. Specificity (Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) of the system, when
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combined with uncertainty, seemed to have no effect on sourcing choice. The research
questions raised by these results are:
RQ1. Which assets are relevant (operating procedures, knowledge of
business rules, architectural), to measure specificity?
RQ2. With respect to which actor (buyer, vendor, technology, or their
combinations) should the asset specificity be measured?
RQ3. What is the nexus with (types of) uncertainty?
It would seem that IT sourcing practices have evolved to make intangible assets more
relevant. In this respect, technologies which affect coordination and agility, rather than
simple automation of tasks, need more attention and theorizing. Research on
interorganizational systems, where ownership of assets is distributed, could be an interesting
area for research.
Frequency
TCE (Williamson, 1985) defines governance structures (p. 60) as “more sensitively
attuned to the governance needs of non-standard transactions than are unspecialized
structures, ceteris paribus”. Frequency of transaction is involved, ranging from occasional to
recurrent.
This dimension was used in four papers, as shown in table 6. Some of these (Apte,
1990, Cheon et al., 1995) are conceptual papers, which hypothesize that low frequency could
lead to high transaction costs. The logics are similar, in that infrequency of contracting
(Cheon et al., 1995) will increase ‘relationship building costs’, or alternatively, buyer should
use the same vendor (Apte, 1990) in multiple contracts.
Frequency
Article

Study Type

Apte

Conceptual

Operationalization

Significance

# sourcing contracts with same vendor

Y

Aubert et al

Case study

Use of different skills

Y*

Cheon et al

Conceptual

Infrequency of contracting

Y

Lacity & Willcocks

Case study

Ongoing activities or occasional

Y

significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk*

Table 6. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension ‘frequency’ in sourcing
The results differ when looking at empirical work (Aubert et al., 1996, Lacity and
Willcocks, 1995). It is interesting to see how the authors look for alternative explanations and
units of analysis to reconcile their results with TCE. Aubert et al (1996) conclude that
“frequency refers to the use of skills…rather than software development projects”. In their
case study sample, most firms were sourcing externally for skills that were required
intermittently. The emphasis, therefore, is more on a load leveling function, rather than
transaction cost. However, these results do not strictly conflict with TCE, which would
expect external contracting for occasional transactions. Another study (Lacity and Willcocks,
1995) attempted to classify its observations into different contract types (according to
governance structures shown in table 2), using the information on asset-specificity and
frequency from their interviews. Even when a limited set of sourcing decisions was
considered (those which were believed to be successful by the sampled firms), anomalies
were detected. Activities’ recurrent nature along with high asset specificity was expected to
result in a relational contract (table 2), but the actual sourcing arrangements were structured
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as neo-classical contracts, i.e., in the top half of the table (instead of lower half). An
alternative explanation within TCE framework is that decision making was necessarily
occasional, motivating IS managers to perceive it as akin to buying capital equipment. This
leads us to the following research questions:
RQ1: Is ‘transaction’ as a unit of analysis applicable to IS sourcing context?
RQ2: What does frequency refer to (buying, use, decision making)?
RQ3: Does decision making dictate the ‘frequency’ that should be used?
As sourcing arrangements tend to emphasize more relational elements, with multiyear contracts, the timeframe is redefined. This would suggest scope for “longitudinal”
application (David and Han, 2004) of TCE. Given that decision making is occasional, and
dominated by relational factors, cultural fit and other social antecedents might become
important. At which point these factors become important, is a key question for research.
Opportunism
TCE (Williamson, 1985) refers to three levels of self-interest (p. 47), from obedience,
simple self-interest seeking, to opportunism. Among these, opportunism is “the strongest
form” that refers to “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”. Strictly
speaking, opportunism is a behavioral assumption of TCE, along with bounded rationality.
This dimension of Transaction Cost Economics is included in four empirical papers
(Table 7). While there are no conflicting results, the levels of significance are not high. It
seems that the context has a role, and the limited explanation that opportunism provides is a
concern.
When the construct is operationalized (Ang and Cummings, 1997) as the availability
of large number of suppliers, the variable was significantly correlated to higher outsourcing.
When the results were analyzed by influencer and size of firm, the effect was significant for
peer conformity in large buyers.
Opportunism
Article

Study Type

Operationalization

Significance

Ang & Cummings

Survey

Adequate supplier presence

Y*

De Looff

Case study

many suppliers

Y*

Loh & Venkatraman

Survey

Breach of contract by vendors
Dependence on specific vendors
Biased portrayal of benefits by vendors

Y*

Nam et al

Survey

potential number of vendors

Y

significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk*

Table 7. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension in sourcing
Two papers show somewhat weaker results. Using case study approach (DeLooff,
1998) availability of sufficient suppliers is seen as an ‘advisable’ condition for outsourcing,
as it reduces small number bargaining problem. However, the controllability criterion is
judged to be ‘medium’ in importance by general managers as well as IS managers. In
contrast, cost is seen as highly important, more so by general managers. The other study (Loh
and Venkatraman, 1995) concludes that average degree of outsourcing is negatively related to
potential opportunism, though it shows the lowest levels of significance among the
independent variables used.
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In contrast, Nam et al (Nam et al., 1996) use the extent of substitution by vendors as a
dependent variable while the potential number of vendors is seen to be insignificant. These
results lead to the following research questions:
RQ1: What are possible measures of opportunism, e.g., relative size of
buyer/seller firm, length of contract?
RQ2: How are peer perceptions on ‘adequacy’ (Ang and Cummings, 1997)
formed in the first place?
RQ3: Is the presence of opportunism a ‘received wisdom’ in the industry?
What are its dynamic characteristics?
Assumptions of self-interest seeking behavior need to be revisited, diluting the basis
of TCE. The conditions under which IT enables cooperation have also been theorized (Kumar
and van Dissel, 1996). Raising questions on behavioral assumptions, and setting the
phenomenon under institutional context holds promise. Behaviors of vendors, and the
antecedents of fairness, are also interesting new research avenues.
Production Cost
Although TCE sets to go beyond “neoclassical production cost” some empirical
studies included production cost factor in addition to the dimensions of transaction costs in
their analysis (Table 8). These results seem to be more conclusive, with each of the papers
showing high explanatory power of the construct.
Production Cost
Article

Study Type

Operationalization

Significance

Ang & Cummings

Survey

External production cost advantage

Y*

Ang & Straub

Survey

Perceived production cost advantage

Y*

De Looff

Case study

Advantages of scale

Y*

Poppo

Survey

scale economies at buyer firm

Y*

significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk*

Table 8. Application of product cost in outsourcing decisions
Comparative production cost advantage through IT outsourcing (Ang and Straub,
1998) was related to higher degree of IS outsourcing. While transaction costs were also
significantly related to outsourcing, the effect was much smaller. Similar results were seen
(Ang and Cummings, 1997) where (external) production cost advantages significantly
correlated with outsourcing. Advantages of scale (DeLooff, 1998), leading to low cost, were
seen as an important criteria by managers- more so among general managers. Scale
economies were seen as important when related to insourcing (Poppo and Zenger, 1998).
The results do not contradict TCE, as “the object is not to economize on transaction
costs but to economize in both transaction and neoclassical production cost respects.”
(Williamson, 1985) (p. 61) However, it raises the hypothetical question: would the effects
that were seen to support TCE prevail, if this measure had been incorporated? It is possible
that the relatively unclear effects of transaction costs would be even weaker, in an extended
and comprehensive operationalization of theory.
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Discussion and Conclusions
There is probably an over-application of TCE in outsourcing research in the sense that
transaction costs so far have not added substantially to our understanding of IT sourcing- in
particular why these decisions are made. It seems that production costs are adequate to
explain the decision outcomes under TCE assumptions of efficiency-seeking. Limited
empirical support for other constructs has been observed in more comprehensive reviews of
TCE, however (David and Han, 2004). Alternatively, a better explanation of the phenomenon
is required, than what current operationalizations of TCE offer in IT sourcing. A related issue
is the sole use of TCE and economics as a reference discipline to explain decision outcomes.
Based on the selected set of articles we might conclude that production cost
advantages are so high that transaction costs are only a minor factor in IT sourcing decisions.
TCE leaves the door open to this possibility (Williamson, 1985) “Whether transaction cost
economies are realized at the expense of scale economies or scope economies thus needs to
be assessed. A trade-off framework is needed to examine the production cost and governance
cost ramifications of alternative modes of organization simultaneously.” Accordingly, cost
pressures (Apte, 1990, Ang and Straub, 1998) and cost predictability were seen as key factors
by some authors.
An overlay of institutional factors on efficiency-seeking behavior might hold some
potential in explaining the confusing results. It has been suggested (Roberts and Greenwood,
1997) that institutional constraints can be ‘grafted’ on the TCE framework. In this integrated
framework, cognitive constraints are hypothesized to limit the evaluation of extant sourcing
arrangement, and the subsequent search for alternatives. The institutional environment further
limits the consideration set into a smaller set of legitimated designs. As there are limited ways
of inferring (rather than observing) cost efficiencies, only highly legitimate designs are
ultimately selected.
Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) is yet another approach, given its success
in study of phenomena less tractable by existing theories. Given the unique nature of IT
(Lacity and Willcocks, 1995), it is possible that resulting theory could be different from the
dynamic capabilities framework, and possibly resemble the relational view (Dyer and Singh,
1998).
One promising and more specific way to theorize around the phenomenon is to move
the discussion to co-evolutionary drivers of outsourcing in contrast to studying only cost-led
determinants. There are some starting points into this direction in the articles, e.g., vendor
availability has dramatically increased (Apte, 1990). This could be explained by expansion of
large IT firms (e.g., HP) into services, and increased global sourcing (Greenemeier, 2002).
Anecdotal evidence of growth in variety and size of outsourcing contracts would suggest a
co-evolution of vendor capability, industry practice, and buyer behaviors. Buyer requirements
could lead to vendors’ capability augmentation in an IT activity, which then leads to new
outsourcing arrangements and successes. Alternatively, vendors could stretch their
capabilities to identify and serve new needs thereby increasing pressures on buyers to
outsource. These innovations then diffuse among less innovative peers, gaining acceptance as
an “established practice”. Highly publicized contracts, such as Kodak (1989) and British
Petroleum (early 90’s) could serve as catalysts in this process. As institutional acceptability
increases, it leads to more firms using outsourcing.
This dynamic view of organizations and environment involves “the joint outcome of
managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects” (Lewin and Volberda, 1999)
with cycles of innovation and imitation. Markus and Robey (1988) discussed early on of the
types of process theories that are available to IS researchers to explain such processes. While
imperative theories are generally variance theories, and organizational/emergent ones are
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process theories, trying to develop an imperative process model has great appeal. It helps
overcome the static nature of variance models, because “while recognizing and accepting the
complexity of causal relationships…(maintain) the goals of generalizability and prediction”
(Markus and Robey, 1988). However, an imperative process model will require longitudinal
data.
In conclusion, the paper ‘unpacks’ TCE research into outsourcing by looking at its
hidden assumptions and different operationalizations. It complements more wide ranging
reviews of TCE (David and Han, 2004) by discussing its application to specific phenomenonIT outsourcing. It also looked for new explanations of sourcing decisions by recommending a
co-evolutionary driver approach. In many ways, the paper adds a new voice to the call for
research (Hui and Beath, 2001) that draws upon an evolutionary perspective of IT service
evolution, including all key stakeholders─buyers as well as sellers, and the IT artifact. The
limitations of the paper include a limited sample of the literature that does not offer
possibilities for meta-analytic procedures, along with the coarse operationalizations of
constructs considered for analysis. A similar analysis on a larger sample (if possible) would
add to the generalizability of conclusions.
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